uconn health
Welcome to the Office of Clinical & Translational Research (draft)
The Office of Clinical & Translational Research (OCTR) supports investigators, research staff, and sponsors by providing expert guidance through the complexities of clinical trial budgets, contract negotiations, and financial compliance at UConn Health.
Our Mission
We ensure that all clinical research conducted at UConn Health complies with federal and state regulations as well as institutional policies — while helping researchers move their studies forward efficiently and responsibly.
What We Do
Our team partners with researchers to provide:
Budget Development & Management
- Build detailed Budget Workbooks for each study to compile an internal study cost estimate.
- Collaborate with PIs to create viable budgets for all clinical trials opened at UConn Health that accrue that accrues John Dempsey Hospital (JDH) and/or UConn Medical Group (UMG) and/or dental charges.
- Establish and reconcile Banner research accounts
Contract Negotiation
- Industry-sponsored and investigator-initiated trials
- University-to-university agreements
- Cooperative group and foundation-supported trials
Financial Compliance & Oversight
- Audit ongoing clinical trials for compliance with institutional, state, and federal requirements
Getting Started (draft)
Contracts & Budgets (draft)
Our Mission
The Human Research Protection (HRP) Education & Outreach (E&O) program is a unified cross-campus initiative to provide education and outreach to all who are involved in research involving human subjects. Our mission is to equip researchers with the knowledge and tools needed to navigate the regulatory landscape of human subjects research.
Through proactive engagement, the program aims to support researchers and promote ethical practices that enhance understanding of human subjects protections across the university community.
The HRP Education & Outreach program goals are to:
- Inform the research community about the latest developments in human subjects protection, including news, guidance, and regulatory updates.
- Educate researchers, IRB members, and IRB staff through tailored outreach and ongoing learning opportunities.
- Support investigators through compliance reviews, self-monitoring tools, and personalized assistance to promote high-quality, ethically sound research.
By offering these resources, we seek to reduce compliance burdens and foster a culture of collaboration and integrity in research involving human participants.
Contact Us
We are here to support your research. Reach out to ask questions, request a consultation, or share feedback.
Email: hrp-education@uconn.edu
Team Contacts:
- Joan Levine, MPH, CIP – Team Lead
- Rebecca Burke, MS
- Ellen Ciesielski
Compliance Monitoring
Human Research Protection Compliance Monitoring Program
Human subjects research at UConn and UConn Health is monitored by the HRP Education & Outreach program. The goal of the monitoring program is to assess compliance of human subjects research with federal, state, local law, and UConn policies, identifying areas for improvement, and providing recommendations and support based on best practices, current policies and the principles set forth in the Belmont Report. More information about the monitoring program can be found in our policies and standard operating procedures.
All active studies are subject to such reviews, including exempt research or studies where a reliance agreement is in place with another institution.
Studies may be randomly selected for a compliance review or chosen for other reasons as described in the applicable policies and procedures. Categories of compliance reviews include routine, informed consent, for-cause, IRB-directed, and investigator-initiated.
A detailed report summarizing the review findings, required actions, and recommendations will be sent to the researcher. Additionally, findings from the review may be shared with individuals responsible for research oversight to reinforce compliance with policies and regulatory requirements. Findings from these reviews help inform and shape future educational offerings.
Related Policies & Procedures:
Institutional Review Entity (IRE)
The Institutional Review Entity (IRE) is established by the research institution to fulfill oversight responsibilities as outlined in USG DURC-PEPP Policy and the USG Implementation Guidance for identification, review, and oversight of life sciences research that is within Category 1 and Category 2 as defined by that policy.
On May 5, 2025, a new Executive Order (EO) was issued calling for modifications to the 2024 United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (often referred to as the “USG DURC-PEPP Policy”).
As the institution awaits additional guidance on how the provisions outlined in the May 5, 2025, EO may impact future research operations, researchers should continue to adhere to all applicable rules, regulations, and processes under the purview of UCH IRE, including all expectations set forth by the current USG-DURC-PEPP Policy (outlined in greater detail below).
UCH implements these federal oversight requirements through the UCH Life Sciences Research of Concern Policy, which outlines institutional responsibilities, investigator expectations, review procedures, and risk mitigation requirements for research falling within the scope of the USG DURC-PEPP Policy.
About the USG DURC-PEPP Policy
At UCH, the USG DURC-PEPP Policy applies to all research, regardless of funding source, which meets the criteria for DURC-PEPP research. Federal sponsors may delay the release of funds if a project identified as DURC-PEPP research does not fulfill all requirements for compliance with the USG DURC-PEPP Policy. This includes research funded or sponsored by federal grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other agreements. The United States Government USG DURC-PEPP Policy supersedes previous DURC policies and the 2017 Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens Framework (P3CO). The USG DURC-PEPP Policy does not supersede, but complements, other existing federal regulations, including the Select Agent Regulations.
All UCH Principal Investigators (PIs) proposing or conducting research involving biological agents and toxins must assess whether or not their research potentially falls under the USG DURC-PEPP Policy. Specifically, PIs proposing to work with or generate any replication-competent infectious agent or proposing to work with a toxin of any amount from the Federal Select Agents and Toxins list must make an assessment of whether the research is reasonably anticipated to be within the scope of Category 1 or Category 2 research. If DURC-PEPP research is identified, the PI must work with the UCH Institutional Review Entity (IRE) (ibc@uchc.edu) to develop a risk-benefit assessment and risk mitigation plan that the funding agency must approve before the work can begin.
Categories of Research
Category 1 Research
Scope: Involves biological agents or toxins from a pre-determined list, which includes over 80 specific agents and toxins (including all select agents and toxins + all RG4 and many/most RG3 agents). These include Bacillus cereus Biovar anthracis, Botulinum neurotoxins, Coxiella burnetii, Ebola virus, Francisella tularensis, SARS-CoV, and others.
Experimental Outcomes: The research is reasonably anticipated to result in, or does result in, one or more of the following nine outcomes:
Increase transmissibility of a pathogen within or between host species.
Increase the virulence of a pathogen or convey virulence to a non-pathogen.
Increase the toxicity of a known toxin or produce a novel toxin.
Increase the stability of a pathogen or toxin in the environment or increase its ability to disseminate.
Alter the host range or tropism of a pathogen or toxin.
Decrease the ability to detect a human or veterinary pathogen or toxin using standard diagnostic or analytical methods.
Increase resistance of a pathogen or toxin to clinical or veterinary prophylactic or therapeutic interventions.
Alter a human or veterinary pathogen or toxin to disrupt the effectiveness of preexisting immunity via immunization or natural infection.
9.Enhance the susceptibility of a host population to a pathogen or toxin.
Category 2 Research
Scope: Involves a Pathogen with Pandemic Potential (PPP) or a Pathogen with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (PEPP). These include pathogens like H5N1 influenza virus, SARS-CoV-2, and MERS-CoV.
Experimental Outcomes: The research is reasonably anticipated to result in, or does result in, one or more of the following four outcomes:
Enhance transmissibility of the pathogen in humans.
Enhance the virulence of the pathogen in humans.
Enhance the immune evasion of the pathogen in humans by modifying it to disrupt pre-existing immunity via immunization or natural infection.
Generate, use, reconstitute, or transfer an eradicated or extinct PPP or a previously identified PEPP.
Responsibilities
Researchers/PIs:
Conduct initial and ongoing self-assessments of research associated with the agents that fall under the DURC policy.
Collaborate with the IRE on risk-benefit analyses.
Draft and implement Risk Mitigation Plans (RMPs) in coordination with the IRE when research is classified as Category 1 or 2.
Ensure ongoing compliance with approved RMPs for Category 1 or 2 research.
Institutional Oversight:
Establish and maintain internal policies/procedures for DURC and PEPP oversight.
Maintain records of assessments, RMPs, and compliance activities.
Assess research with agents that fall under the new DURC policy to determine if research falls under Category 1 or 2.
Submit required reports to federal agencies.
Provide education and training to researchers and staff involved in high-risk research.
Appendix: Category 1 Agents and Toxins List:
HHS Select Agents and Toxins
Abrin
Bacillus cereus Biovar anthracis
Botulinum neurotoxins
Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridium
Conotoxins (Short, paralytic alpha conotoxins containing the following amino acid sequence X1CCX2PACGX3X4X5X6CX7)
Coxiella burnetii
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
Diacetoxyscirpenol
Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus
Ebola virus
Francisella tularensis
Lassa fever virus
Lujo virus
Marburg virus
Mpox virus
Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus containing any portion of the coding regions of all eight gene segments (Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus)
Ricin
Rickettsia prowazekii
SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
SARS-CoV/SARS-CoV-2 chimeric viruses resulting from any deliberate manipulation of SARS-CoV-2 to incorporate nucleic acids coding for SARS-CoV virulence factors
Saxitoxin
South American Haemorrhagic Fever viruses:
Chapare
Guanarito
Junín
Machupo
Sabia
Staphylococcal enterotoxins (subtypes A,B,C,D,E)
T-2 toxin
Tetrodotoxin
Tick-borne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses:
Far Eastern subtype
Siberian subtype
Kyasanur Forest disease virus
Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus
Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)
Variola minor virus (Alastrim)
Yersinia pestis
Overlap Select Agents and Toxins
Bacillus anthracis
Bacillus anthracis Pasteur strain
Brucella abortus
Brucella melitensis
Brucella suis
Burkholderia mallei
Burkholderia pseudomallei
Hendra virus
Nipah virus
Rift Valley fever virus
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
USDA Veterinary Services (VS) Select Agents and Toxins
African horse sickness virus
African swine fever virus
Avian influenza virus
Classical swine fever virus
Foot-and-mouth disease virus
Goat pox virus
Lumpy skin disease virus
Mycoplasma capricolum
Mycoplasma mycoides
Newcastle disease virus
Peste des petits ruminants virus
Rinderpest virus
Sheep pox virus
Swine vesicular disease virus
USDA Plant Protection And Quarantine (PPQ) Select Agents and Toxins
Coniothyrium glycines (formerly Phoma glycinicola and Pyrenochaeta glycines)
Peronosclerospora philippinensis (Peronosclerospora sacchari)
Ralstonia solanacearum
Rathayibacter toxicus
Sclerophthora rayssiae
Synchytrium endobioticum
Xanthomonas oryzae
For biological agents affecting humans that have not been assigned a Risk Group in the NIH Guidelines, agents affecting humans that are recommended to be handled at BSL3 or BSL4 per the BMBL guidance are subject to the USG DURC-PEPP Policy
NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (NIH Guidelines), Appendix B, Risk Group 4 and subset of Risk Group 3
Risk Group 4 (RG4) – Viral Agents
Arenaviruses
Guanarito virus
Lassa virus
Junin virus (except the candid #1 vaccine strain listed in Appendix B-II-D Risk Group2 (RG2) – Viruses)
Machupo virus
Sabia
Bunyaviruses (Nairovirus)
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus
Filoviruses
Ebola viruses
Marburg viruses
Flaviruses – Group B Arboviruses
Tick-borne encephalitis virus complex including Absetterov, Central European encephalitis, Hanzalova, Hypr, Kumlinge, Kyasanur Forest disease, Omsk hemorrhagic fever, and Russian spring-summer encephalitis viruses
Herpesviruses (alpha)
Herpesvirus simiae (Herpes B or Monkey B virus)
Paramyxoviruses
Equine Morbillivirus (Hendra virus)
Hemorrhagic fever viruses as yet undefined
Risk Group 3 (RG3) – Bacterial Agents Including Rickettsia*
Bartonella
Brucella including B. abortus, B. canis, B. suis
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei, B. pseudomallei
Coxiella burnetii (except the Phase II, Nine Mile strain listed in Appendix B-II-A, Risk Group 2 (RG2) – Bacterial Agents Including Chlamydia)
Francisella tularensis (except those strains listed in Appendix B-II-A, Risk Group 2 (RG2) – Bacterial Agents Including Chlamydia)
Orientia tsutsugamushi (was R. tsutsugamushi)
Pasteurella multocida type B -“buffalo” and other virulent strains
Rickettsia akari, R. australis, R. canada, R. conorii, R. prowazekii, R. rickettsii, R. siberica, R. typhi (R. mooseri)
Yersinia pestis (except those strains listed in Appendix B-II-A, Risk Group 2 (RG2) – Bacterial Agents Including Chlamydia)
Risk Group 3 (RG3) – Viruses and Prions*
Alphaviruses (Togaviruses) – Group A Arboviruses
Chikungunya virus (except the vaccine strain 181/25 listed in Appendix B-II-D Risk Group2 (RG2) – Viruses)
Semliki Forest virus
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus (except the vaccine strains TC-83 and V3526, see Appendix-II-D (RG2) – Viruses)
Other viruses as listed in the reference source (see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections I through IV)
Arenaviruses
Flexal
Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCM) (neurotropic strains)
Bunyaviruses
Hantaviruses including Hantaan virus
Rift Valley fever virus
Coronaviruses
SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
Flaviviruses- Group B Arboviruses
Japanese encephalitis virus (except those strains listed in Appendix B-II-D Risk Group2 (RG2) – Viruses)
Yellow fever virus
Other viruses as listed in the reference source (see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections I through IV)
Orthomyxoviruses
Influenza viruses 1918-1919 H1N1 (1918 H1N1), human H2N2 (1957-1968), and highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 strains within the Goose/Guangdong/96-like H5 lineage (HPAI H5N1).
Poxviruses
Monkeypox virus (Clade I & Clade II containing nucleic acids coding for clade I MPVX virus virulence factors)
Prions
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) agents (Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease and kuru agents)(see Section V-C, Footnotes and References of Sections I through IV, for containment instruction)
EXCLUDED RG3 Agents:
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) types 1 and 2
Human T cell lymphotropic virus (HTLV) types 1 and 2
Simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV)
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Mycobacterium bovis
Clade II of MPVX viruses unless containing nucleic acids coding for clade I MPVX virus virulence factors
Vesicular stomatitis virus
Coccidioides immitis (sporulating cultures; contaminated soil)
Histoplasma capsulatum, H. capsulatum var. duboisii
Compliance
Sponsored Program Services (SPS) is developing a comprehensive compliance program. As the program develops, opportunities will be listed on the links available on the sidebar.
Guidelines – Stop Work Orders
Federal Stop-Work or Grant Termination Directives
These guidelines are intended to assist investigators who may be at risk for or have received a directive from a federal funding agency to stop, pause, terminate or otherwise prematurely end a human research study. Please contact the IRB Office if you have any questions or need assistance.
Euthanasia of Sick Animals by CCM Veterinary Staff
Purpose
In order to comply with federal regulations (USDA and PHS) and the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, UConn Health’s IACUC has established a policy on euthanasia of sick animals by CCM veterinary staff.
Action
- When sick animals are found by animal caretakers (ACT), a sick report is written up and an email is sent to the PI and/or contact individual identified on cage cards.
- The CCM Veterinary Services is also cc’d on the e-mail correspondence for their evaluation.
- If the animal is displaying signs of humane endpoints as identified in the animal care and use protocol or has a Body Condition Score (BCS) of 2 or less, veterinary staff will send an email to the PI and/or contact individual with recommendation of euthanasia. This may or may not be after consultation with the Attending Veterinarian. If the recommendation is for euthanasia of the animals, the email will include a due date and time for corrective action to the research staff. The PI must respond by email within 24 hours. If no response is received, this will be interpreted as consent by the PI to the medical opinion of the veterinary staff as to the disposition of the animal. The PI will be charged accordingly.
- If the veterinary staff identify the same animal during their routine veterinary clinical rounds, they will euthanize the animal and report it to PI and the IACUC.
- If the animal is moribund or in severe distress, the Veterinary Services can euthanize the animal immediately and notify the PI/research staff. If the animals are under Death as an Endpoint or EAE studies, they should be posted in the room or identified at cage level to avoid confusion.
Effective Dates: January 31, 2025 through December 31, 2027
This policy has been approved by a majority vote of the UConn Health IACUC
